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authorEli Schwartz <eschwartz@archlinux.org>2018-12-01 19:36:23 -0500
committerErich Eckner <git@eckner.net>2019-04-02 11:17:45 +0200
commit90f960a2484ce7be10a572f66d962ca0e3759de5 (patch)
tree7c04365eb0188aae2629af8706d8ccebb491358e /commitpkg
parent38ee211a6a89dfd8e9d017d694d032a273a2de39 (diff)
downloaddevtools32-90f960a2484ce7be10a572f66d962ca0e3759de5.tar.xz
arch-nspawn: don't delete the guest gpg configuration
It's important to ensure the guest has up to date data because updating a chroot after quite some time can potentially rely on updated archlinux-keyring, something which the host machine either kept up to date on or manually fixed, but it kills automation to mess around with chroot configs like that. Alternatively, signed packages added with -I need to work, and we assume the host is configured to accept these. That is *not* a good reason to completely nuke whatever is in the guest, though. A guest might have been manually configured to accept keys which aren't accepted by the host; one example of this happening in practice, is archlinux32 when building 32-bit packages from an archlinux host. A simple solution is to use pacman-key's native facility to dump the known keys and trust status from one gpg configuration, and import it into another. Use this to append to, rather than overwrite, the chrooted guest's pacman keyring. While we are at it, fix a bug where we didn't respect the host's pacman.conf settings for the GpgDir. While it isn't wildly likely a user will choose to customize this, it is a valid and supported use case and we must think about this ourselves.
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